The Way to Durable Peace

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The Way to Durable Peace:
By: R.S. Mooshahary

Assam has been in the intermittent throes of terrorist violence since long with fear
psychosis gripping the populace across the length and breath of the State continually.
That a small group of armed rebels is able to terrorize the entire population of 30
million spread over an area of 78,438 sq km for so long brings into focus certain stark
realities: the State is not in a position to guarantee security to its citizens; the
terrorists have an element of public support within the State; and this state of affairs
cannot be resolved save through a spirit of confidence building among the stakeholders.

ULFA is no doubt the outfit associated with terrorist violence in the State. Some people
may call them insurgents; some would label them as plain extortionists and terrorists,
but whatever they are, they have repeatedly proved their potential for unleashing terror
at their will. Even then, there are people who would like to believe that the outfit is
moribund and breathing its last. Confined in the security cocoons of their offices, they
prioritize in first neutralizing ULFA before any move for negotiations. They tend to think
that Army deployment is the winning strategy, but in reality it is a roadblock to peace
process. Army operation against ULFA is not a new thing. It has been happening off and on
for many years. What is new is that every time the Army operates, some people think that
it is the last expedition against the outlaws and that peace will prevail thereafter.
This time too, tall claims have emanated from Army authorities that it is going to be
the end of ULFA.
This is not going to be so. Armed struggles are not the result of a handful of people
taking the extreme step to tread the violent path for pleasure because those who practice
it also know that the same barrel of the gun they use to kill others will also kill them
eventually. They are not — to borrow a hackneyed term — the misguided youth
risking their lives. They are rightly or wrongly indicators of the deep-set ills arising
out of societal inequilibrium. Each one of them is the victim of circumstances that provide
no choice other than expressing the anger through bullets and explosives because that is
the only language that is loud enough to create impact in the maze of exploitation,
injustice and corruption that have gripped the society.
In such an ambience, many consider the operation against the rebels as an act of oppression
of the innocent; any killing instantly transforms the person into a martyr. This perception
is in direct proportion to the intensity of action by the security forces — the more
the killing, searches and raids, the higher is the resentment and greater the public support
for militants. At the end of the day, regardless of the number of militants neutralized,
the scorecard will always be in their favour. Then in due course of time, a fresh crop of
recruits will join the organization, get trained, armed and repeat the cycle of storm
following the lull. How can there be peace in such a vicious rigmarole?

It is true that people hate ULFA more than they love them for what they have inflicted on
the State; but surely not all are against them. It is a commonplace explanation that they
are the result of underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty and chauvinism. In reality these
are only contributory causes; the prime reason for its emergence and sustenance being the
widening inequities perpetuated by exploitation and corruption. The repulsion against
injustice and neglect that the corrupt public functionaries perpetrate on the society and
individuals, finds utterance in militancy and armed struggle, which quickly empower them
to settle score and be in charge. It is, therefore, the systemic abuse and the absence of
any effective remedial means that creates militancy and insurgency.

The government has been talking to the militant organizations without insisting on any
precondition. Even an outfit like NSCN(I-M) — the mother of insurgency-related
violence in the country since independence and whose demand is deep-rooted in the concept
of sovereign Nagaland — is today negotiating with the government on a long-term basis.
It has facilitated ceasefire for a considerable period and resultant security for the people.
The government has also agreed to negotiate with NDFB, which is uncompromising in its demand
for the sovereign Bodoland, after striking repeated ceasefire accords with it.

The government must learn from experience that bringing the militant groups to the
negotiating table in itself is an act of disarming them and suspending violence. It
instills in them a sense of responsibility to introspect on the futility of armed struggle
where there are no winners. It is also a process of disabling the militants to pursue
their wanton violence without undermining their ego. This is exactly what is happening
to NSCN(I-M) and NDFB. Once-feared terrorists with the history of rabid brutality and
awful fire-power, they have assiduously avoided committing violence during the tenure
of truce.

The government is an impersonal entity – it has no heart, soul or feelings. It is
the governed, who suffer for the misdeeds of the government. Therefore, those who govern
need to develop a sense of empathy for the trauma of those they govern. This alone will
make the government a people’s government — people who can look up to Dispur
rather than to Delhi to facilitate peace, prosperity and security. As with NDFB, with whom
formal negotiation is yet to take off, a ceasefire charter with ULFA, without insisting on
preconditions, is the precondition for peace.

Insurgency-induced violence is a spirit and an idea cloaked in the garb of terrorists,
which defies elimination. We can extern it for a period but nor exterminate; subdue it at
times but not subjugate permanently. Until and unless this cardinal truth is understood by
those who are responsible for deciding the destiny of Assam, any operation, whether by the
Army or by any agency, will only remain a costly exercise in cosmetics. For one militant
killed, there are many others in the queue of unemployment and poverty to opt for the life
of adventure and influence. Therefore, even physically there can be no decimation of the
insurgents.

The irony is that the government that is primarily responsible for protection of life and
liberty of the people is unmindful of its own limitations. It cannot afford protection in
every village, town, road and countryside whatever is the numerical strength of security
forces under its command. It cannot also wipe out insurgents from the face of the State by
using its might. There will always be fragments of fresh inductees in the outfit who will
find soft target to strike at any given situation, and that is what they have been doing
with impunity. Moreover, every time it happens, the government reacts with vengeance,
thereby providing the militants with the much-needed oxygen in the form of publicity and
public sympathy. That is what actually has happened after the militants killed some
Hindi-speaking people, which prompted the ongoing Army operation. ULFA was on the verge
of being isolated and the people started ignoring them, but the Army action has revived
the people’s concern for them. This reaction is fraught with the risk of prolonging
violence. Admittedly, negotiation is the only way to find a solution to this intractable
problem.
Why should there be preconditions for talks? After all, the talks are about finding out
meeting grounds by bridging the hiatus, and anything under the sun should be open for
discussion. It does not mean conceding a point but laying the brickwork of confidence,
which alone will lead to the spirit of accommodation. To say that ULFA must first abjure
violence or the sovereignty issue is out of bounds for talks, is putting spokes of distrust
on the necessity for talks itself. Again, releasing a few incarcerated persons to enable
them to participate in talks does not mean overlooking their criminal conduct. The
government has been releasing criminals under duress, entering into ceasefire agreements
and negotiations with militant groups without preconditions. The same parameters must
govern the government’s attitude in dealing with ULFA.

There is doubt, however, that no government can let the outlaws break law and put the life,
liberty and property of the individuals at peril. While exercising this sovereign function,
a prudent government must opt for the effective as well as acceptable alternatives.
The Assam Police is a much-maligned force, but one must see them on their duties day in
and day out. Given the plethora of problems and shortcomings, this force has acquitted
quite well and no other force could have done better. It is functioning with depleted
strength with no proper training, rest and amenities. The force has a deficiency of
7,416 — which translates to about 15 per cent of its total workforce and this
in itself is a performance decelerator, which the government must remove forthwith.
In a State with mounting unemployment that poses threat to its very security as the
young unemployed, out of disgust and frustration, often take refuge in militancy, this
negligence to fill up the vacancy in the organization responsible for ensuring security
is very irrational. It is the crying imperative that the government quickly fills up
these vacancies; trains, equips and deploys the strengthened State police for
anti-insurgency operations supplemented by the central police forces.

The State Government has recently proved its potential for delivering the goods by
successfully holding the 33rd National Games despite many odds. This one, the peace
initiative, is a greater challenge and success in it will go down in history as the
shinning trophy for achievement of this government.

(The writer is the State Chief Information Commissioner, Assam, prior to which he was
also the Director General, Border Security Force and the National Security Guard)

(The writer is Chief Information Commissioner, Asom)